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The interpretation of quantum mechanics known as QBism developed out of efforts
to understand the probabilities arising in quantum physics as Bayesian in character.
But this development was neither easy nor without casualties. Many ideas voiced,
and even committed to print, during earlier stages of Quantum Bayesianism turn
out to be quite fallacious when seen from the vantage point of QBism.
If the profession of science history needed a motto, a good candidate would be, “I think
you’ll find it’s a bit more complicated than that.” This essay explores a particular application
of that catechism, in the generally inconclusive and dubiously reputable area known as
quantum foundations.
QBism is a research program that can briefly be defined as
an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the ideas of agent and ex-
perience are fundamental. A “quantum measurement” is an act that an agent
performs on the external world. A “quantum state” is an agent’s encoding of her
own personal expectations for what she might experience as a consequence of
her actions. Moreover, each measurement outcome is a personal event, an expe-
rience specific to the agent who incites it. Subjective judgments thus comprise
much of the quantum machinery, but the formalism of the theory establishes
the standard to which agents should strive to hold their expectations, and that
standard for the relations among beliefs is as objective as any other physical
theory [1].
The first use of the term QBism itself in the literature was by Fuchs and Schack in June
2009 [2]. Prior to this, they had employed it in talks and correspondence [3, p. 1707],
illustrating the lexicographer’s principle that words predate their preservation in books.
Introducing a collection of correspondence, Fuchs wrote that three characteristics of the
QBist research program distinguish it from existing interpretations [3, p. ix].
First is its crucial reliance on the mathematical tools of quantum information
theory to reshape the look and feel of quantum theory’s formal structure. Second
is its stance that two levels of radical “personalism” are required to break the
interpretational conundrums plaguing the theory. Third is its recognition that
with the solution of the theory’s conundrums, quantum theory does not reach
an end, but is the start of a great journey.
QBism grew out of Quantum Bayesianism, a loosely-defined school of thought typified
by a paper by Caves, Fuchs and Schack, “Quantum probabilities as Bayesian probabilities”
([4], hereinafter CFS 2002). The most prominent thread within Quantum Bayesianism may
be the one that, in the hands of Fuchs and Schack, later developed into QBism, but the term
is applicable much more broadly. It encompasses some writings of Bub and Pitowsky [5–7],
for example, and could easily include earlier suggestions of Youssef [8] and Baez [9], work
by Leifer and Spekkens [10], the “entropic dynamics” of Caticha [11] and so forth. These
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2views overlap to the extent that they all advocate interpreting the probabilities in quantum
physics according to some variety of Bayesianism. They overlap, but they do not coincide.
What else should one expect, given that even before quantum physics was brought into
the game, the jest that there were “46,656 varieties of Bayesianism” [12] was only a mild
exaggeration?
Perusing the quantum-foundational literature and partaking in conversations with quan-
tum foundationers, I have been surprised by the inclination to cite CFS 2002 as defining
QBism. Sometimes, it is invoked by itself as the canonical QBist document, and on other
occasions, it is mixed together indiscriminately with genuinely QBist sources. Without com-
menting in depth on the merits of these varied works, I find this situation puzzling. All three
authors disavow the perspective of this paper [2, 13], whether they have continued along the
path of developing QBism (Fuchs and Schack) or not (Caves).
The philosophy of science, we fondly imagine, should be the discipline that exposes the
distinctions which physicists coarsely gloss over. Perhaps QBism has generated too many
expositions to pay attention to just one [14–17], but reading is in the scholar’s job description,
and fortunately, not all QBist writings are as long as some of them are. Indeed, some authors
have gotten the coordinates right for genuine QBist expositions [18–21].
Space constraints and the mostly ahistorical writing style of physics journals have pre-
vented earlier QBist articles from delineating which Quantum Bayesian papers still have
valuable portions, which are nearly obsolete, which are by authors who may sympathize
with QBism without fully subscribing to it, and so forth. (These constraints have also in-
hibited enumerating those articles which fail to distinguish CFS 2002 from genuinely QBist
sources, which ones seem to ignore all more recent developments and take CFS 2002 as the
latest word in “informational interpretations”, etc.) And among the more leisurely portray-
als of QBism, the book by von Baeyer [22] was pitched to the general pop-science audience,
making it ill-suited to address the “inside baseball” matters like different schools of Bayesian-
ism. Apart from a brief note in the context of a trendy but confined discussion [23], I myself
have not drawn a hard line between QBism and the more amorphous Quantum Bayesianism
that came before it, thinking in my innocence that the progression of thought was dramatic
enough that it did not need pointing out. Correcting this deficit — and atoning, in part,
for my blithe naïveté — turns out to be an educational exercise. This is the second time I
have marshalled historical evidence to show that a well-cited work was not in fact QBist,
despite third-party claims to that effect [24]. From the viewpoint of QBism’s h-index, this
must appear a quixotic or even self-destructive effort, but integrity is never easy.
I. LOCATING QBISM
Statements about probability have been given many different interpretations over the
years. One sect would read an equation like “p = 0.7” as a claim about relative frequency
in a large ensemble, while another would like to take it as concerning the extent to which
a proposition follows logically from evidence. The Bayesian tradition regards probabilities
as quantities asserted by gamblers, and it is within this tradition that QBism situates itself.
Each of these intellectual genera contains many species. Within Bayesianism, one might
mandate that in principle, all probabilities should reduce to 0 or 1 — maximal and complete
information must resolve all uncertainty. This is the spirit we find, for example, in Jaynes
or Garrett [25]. Another aspiration has it that within each physical situation, there dwells
something like a chance density or a ratio of up to down probabilitons, so that any gambler
3aware of the value of that “objective chance” must set her odds to the exact figure it im-
plies. This is difficult, perhaps impossible, to make logically self-consistent or to integrate
with known quantities in physics; in day-to-day work, the postulation of such properties
seems extraneous to scientific practice [17]. QBism instead follows the lead of personalist
Bayesianism, a view historically associated with Ramsey and de Finetti [26, 27]. It es-
chews the probabilitons and finds objectivity at a different level. For the QBist, no intrinsic
attribute of a physical system can itself compel the outcome of a quantum measurement
upon that system, nor even the probabilities that an agent should ascribe to the potential
outcomes of that measurement before she performs it.
The research program of QBism does not content itself with providing a story for the
familiar mathematical formalism of quantum theory. Nor is it satisfied with detailing how
QBism differs from previous attempts to interpret the quantum — a harmless pastime for
those who treasure the peace of library basements. Rather, the goal is to understand why
that formalism is useful: Why quantum theory, as opposed to any alternative we might
envision? QBism finds the exhortation to “shut up and calculate!” unstable against per-
turbations by curiosity: “Were the world a different way, would we not, after we shut up,
calculate in a different fashion?” [28].
Three Greek-derived words are helpful in discussing interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics. Ontic refers to entities and quantities that exist, in their own right, in blunt reality
— in a Newtonian worldview, the mass of a rock is ontic. Epistemic quantities have the
character of knowledge, while doxastic, from the Greek for “belief”, captures the personalist
Bayesian view of probabilities, and thus the QBist interpretation of quantum states. Writ-
ing a wavefunction |ψ〉 is staking out a doxastic claim, though the fact that it has proven
useful to use vectors in complex Hilbert spaces to express our doxastic statements has an
ontological lesson subtly coded within it.
QBism is largely orthogonal to matters of “Bayesian inference” as understood in statistics
or big-data science [1, §9]. Attempting to grasp what QBism is about by extrapolating a
Google University education in those subjects has led more than a few poor souls into
confusion, whether they recognize it or not.
The remainder of this article will be devoted to identifying the differences between QBism
and what we might call “proto-QBism”, the views articulated by Fuchs, Schack and coau-
thors in the 1990s and early 2000s. We will begin with the CFS 2002 paper mentioned
above, which in my informal experience has been most commonly confused with QBism
proper, and which provides a rather nice contrast with it. We will follow that with a close
study of a follow-up article that Caves, Fuchs and Schack wrote a few years later, which as
we will see still is not QBism. We will then backtrack and examine older writings of Fuchs
himself that are less widely invoked, and whose distance from QBism is in certain aspects
almost shocking. Our final exhibit will be a position statement that Fuchs and Asher Peres
wrote for Physics Today. My hope is that revealing this history may help explicate why
QBism developed as it did, and that it may aid those displeased with QBism to be unhappy
with QBism itself instead of a confabulation.
II. CAVES–FUCHS–SCHACK (2002)
CFS 2002 makes a case that quantum probabilites should be regarded as Bayesian prob-
abilities, but it doesn’t do much more than that — at least, not very well, and from a QBist
perspective, not convincingly.
4The ceaseless and uncritical invocation of “maximal information” in CFS 2002 is legiti-
mately grating to a QBist ear. At best, one can wincingly try to find a reading where it is
tautological, treating the statements Alice has maximal information about a system S and
Alice ascribes a pure quantum state to system S as wholly synonymous. But one would be
cruelly paid back for such generosity. The years have taught us that it is just not possible to
shake the connotations of “maximal information” — connotations of pre-existing properties,
of the “ontic states” that a more timid view would want to underlie quantum theory. As
Fuchs and Schack would write much later [2],
The trouble with the phrase “maximal information is not complete” and the
imagery it entails is that, try as one might to portray it otherwise (by adding
“cannot be completed,” say), it hints of hidden variables. What else could the
“not complete” refer to?
Therefore, we must read CFS 2002 through the prism of this later repudiation of it. Section
IV begins,
Our concern now is to show that if a scientist has maximal information about
a quantum system, Dutch-book consistency forces him to assign a unique pure
state. Maximal information in the classical case means knowing the outcome
of all questions with certainty. Gleason’s theorem forbids such all-encompassing
certainty in quantum theory. Maximal information in quantum theory instead
corresponds to knowing the answer to a maximal number of questions (i.e.,
measurements described by one-dimensional orthogonal projectors).
The language about “knowing the answer to a maximal number of questions” is redolent of
ideas that QBism learned after much scrutiny to leave behind. These ideas go by names like
“the eigenstate-eigenvalue link” and “the EPR criterion of reality”; their underlying, unex-
amined premise is that a probability-1 prediction equates to an objective, agent-independent
physical truth.
How could we ever reconcile this language with the QBist insistence that a quantum
measurement does not simply read off a pre-existing physical quantity? It just doesn’t
work. Every instance of “maximal information” in CFS 2002 is an ironic echo of the tradi-
tional mantra in a scientist’s concluding remarks: When it came to the matter of conceptual
consistency, further research was needed.
“Knowing the answer to a maximal number of questions” applies to the Spekkens toy
model, by construction [29]. In this model, the fundamental atom is a system with four
possible physical states. The observer is restricted never to know more than one bit of
information about an atom that would require two bits to describe fully. It follows that
there are three possible binary-valued tests that the observer can perform on an atom,
but no state of knowledge can allow the answer to more than one of them to be foreseen.
Consequently, the posit that “Maximal information . . . corresponds to knowing the answer
to a maximal number of questions” does not really get at anything uniquely quantum at
all [29].
QBists have argued that the restriction in certainty is not fundamental, but rather de-
rived. In order to explore this point, we must do something that is doubtless anathema in
philosphical circles: discuss new technical developments rather than old terminology. The
crucial idea is the concept of a reference measurement [30]. Now that the kilogram is no
longer defined as a particular lump of platinum-iridium alloy [31], there is room in the vault
5for a Bureau of Standards quantum measurement device. Consider a physicist Alice who
has a qubit system in her possession. She can go to the Bureau of Standards and drop her
system into the standard measurement device for qubits. Such a device must have at least
four possible outputs that it can generate; that is, Alice’s mathematical representation of
it must be a POVM with at least four elements. Let p(Hi) denote Alice’s probability for
obtaining outcome number i. Suppose that she intends to perform some other measurement
{Ej}: perhaps a von Neumann test corresponding to an orthonormal basis, or perhaps a
trine POVM [32], or even a “noisy icosahedron” POVM relevant to the theory of excep-
tional Lie algebras [33]. Let r(Ej|Hi) denote her probability for eliciting outcome j in this
other experiment given that she has performed the Bureau of Standards reference POVM
and obtained outcome i in it first. Quantum theory then furnishes the tools for Alice to
compute her probability q(Ej) for eliciting outcome j in this other measurement without her
carrying out the reference experiment first. The vector of these probabilities will be
q = µ(p, r), (1)
where µ is some function that depends upon the details of the reference measurement.
A simple and illuminating choice is to make the reference measurement a POVM that
corresponds to a regular tetrahedron inscribed in the Bloch sphere. For example, letting a
and b take the values ±1, then the four positive semidefinite operators
Hab =
1
4
(
I + 1√
3
(aσx + bσy + abσz)
)
(2)
sum to the identity and thus constitute a POVM. With p(Hab) = tr(ρHab) by the Born Rule
and r(Ej|Hab) = 2tr(EjHab) by the Lüders Rule, we have
q(Ej) = tr(ρEj) =
∑
ab
[
3p(Hab)− 12
]
r(Ej|Hab). (3)
In this case, the function µ takes the form of the classical Law of Total Probability but
with an elementwise deformation of the probability vector p. The reference measurement
establishes a mapping from density matrices into probability vectors, thereby yielding a
wholly probabilistic representation of the quantum theory of a qubit. Not all probability
vectors p correspond to valid quantum states in this representation. In fact, with any
minimal informationally complete (MIC) experiment as the reference POVM, the state space
is mapped into a proper subset of the four-outcome probability simplex. No more than one
entry in a valid probability vector p can be equal to zero. Or, geometrically speaking, the
vertices of the reference probability simplex are unavailable. This has the character of an
uncertainty principle: Alice’s state of expectation can only be so sharp. But this is just
a consequence of a deeper truth, namely that because intrinsic “hidden variables” do not
exist, one should not use the Law of Total Probability to intermediate between different
experiments [34, 35].
Later, CFS 2002 gets to this problematic passage:
In the classical case an i.i.d. assignment is often the starting point of a probabilis-
tic argument. Yet in Bayesian probability theory, an i.i.d. can never be strictly
justified except in the case of maximal information, which in the classical case
implies certainty and hence trivial probabilities. The reason is that the only way
6to be sure all the trials are identical in the classical case is to know everything
about them, which implies that the results of all trials can be predicted with
certainty [Jaynes [36]].
Note that the citation supporting this argument is to E. T. Jaynes’ unfinished text-
book [36]. A QBist naturally asks, “If my probabilities really are mine, then who’s to stop
me from choosing an i.i.d. prior? Experience may lead me to revise my beliefs away from
that prior, but I have every right to assert it in the first place.” One could square the argu-
ment against the legitimacy of classical i.i.d. priors with a Jaynesian view, but ultimately
not with a Ramseyan one. Saying “to be sure all the trials are identical” amounts to saying
“to be sure the probabilities are physically equal”. The argument in CFS 2002 is a relic of an
objective-Bayesian interpretation. One way to express this shift of interpretation is to say
that in CFS 2002, probabilities are epistemic (about knowledge), while in QBism proper,
they are doxastic (about belief). CFS 2002 is saying that an i.i.d. prior is only justified when
the ratio of up to down probabilitons is constant across all the trials, and that is just not a
kind of Bayesianism that QBism can endorse.
CFS 2002 declares (italics in original),
Since one of the chief challenges of Bayesianism is the search for methods to
translate information into probability assignments, Gleason’s theorem can be
regarded as the greatest triumph of Bayesian reasoning.
From a QBist perspective, this is peculiar. Gleason’s theorem proves that it is possible
to chop off part of the standard formalism of quantum theory and then re-grow it from
the remainder [37]. More specifically, Gleason showed that if measurements correspond to
orthonormal bases on a Hilbert space, and if the probability of a measurement outcome does
not depend upon which basis the corresponding vector is embedded in, then any consistent
way of assigning probabilities to measurement outcomes has to take the form of the Born
rule. Thus, if Π is a projection operator and p(Π) is the probability ascribed to obtaining
the outcome corresponding to Π, then we must have
p(Π) = tr(ρΠ) (4)
for some density matrix ρ. Both the set of valid ρ and the rule for what to do with a ρ come
tumbling out of Gleason’s insight. This is of course pertinent to the project of reconstructing
quantum theory, a task to which much QBist and QBist-adjacent effort has been devoted
— but Gleason’s theorem itself has barely figured in that effort. Why? One reason is that
the premises of Gleason’s theorem are themselves rather late in the game: Gleason’s starting
point is a Hilbert space and orthonormal bases upon it. The natural question is thus how to
arrive at Hilbert space — out of all the mental contrivances that the mathematicians have
conjured, why that very particular class of structure? The stated goal of the reconstruction
project in which Fuchs and others have participated is to derive complex Hilbert space,
linear operators, the space of valid quantum states and all the rest of the formalism from
principles that are more deeply rooted. In that light, Gleason’s theorem is more a proof
of principle, a historically significant demonstration that the machinery can be taken apart
and rebuilt, rather than “the greatest triumph” of anything.
Busch [38] — and, later, independently Caves et al. [39] — proved an analogue of Glea-
son’s theorem in which POVMs are the basic notion of measurement.1 Gleason’s original
1 Busch discovered this result while salvaging von Neumann’s attempt at a no-hidden-variables proof. The
7theorem fails for two-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The essential reason is that in two dimen-
sions, one cannot hold one vector of a basis in place and twirl the rest of the basis around
to generate multiple distinct measurements. This difficulty does not apply to the POVM
version of the theorem. The question of which classes of measurements allow the proof of
a Gleason-type theorem continues to be studied [45–47]. For the present purposes, we need
only note that the emphasis on orthonormal bases is another way that CFS 2002 does not
read at all like the genuinely QBist writings of Fuchs and Schack.
In my experience, Gleason’s theorem is unfamiliar to many physicists, and when they
learn of it, they may find it unsatisfying. This warrants a moment of consideration. I suspect
that they want a story about energy flow, thermalization, a phase transition manifesting as
symmetry breaking. (I went to physicist school too!) But here we have no initial coarse
approximation by dimensional analysis, no semi-heuristic judgments about the comparative
strengths of different couplings. The state space and the Born Rule just fall out of the
geometry, like a regular pentagon from a nest of construction lines. The emotional reaction
is to say that there is no physics in it.2 But the math — intricate, laborious, much simplified
by POVMs — does work. The lesson, to a certain mindset, is that pursuing a “physics
answer” in the pedestrian sense is redundant, needless, an effort better spent elsewhere.
Next, we consider the interpretation that CFS 2002 places on the quantum de Finetti
theorem [52–55]. This is a quantum analogue of the de Finetti theorem in classical prob-
ability theory, which provides a viable meaning for the term “unknown probability” in a
subjectivist, or personalist, form of Bayesianism. Consider a scenario in which an agent
wishes to conduct a long experiment, made up of many successive trials. We can represent
the outcome of each trial by a random variable xj, and Alice assigns a joint probability dis-
tribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) over the possible outcomes of an N -trial experiment. Imposing
two conditions on this joint distribution turns out to simplify its form dramatically. First,
we require that it be finitely exchangeable: Its value is invariant under permutations of its
arguments. If pi is any permutation of the indices {1, . . . , N}, then
p(x1, . . . , xN) = p(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(N)). (5)
Second, we require that Alice’s p(x1, . . . , xN) be extendable, in the following manner. For
structure of POVMs allows one to make an additivity condition that replaces the unwarranted assump-
tion in von Neumann’s argument, the postulate that had been criticized by Hermann and probably by
Einstein [40–44].
2 Zurek [48] calls Gleason’s proof “rather complicated”. True, but it’s no Four Color Theorem, and a pro-
fession that boasts of using over 6300 tenth-order Feynman diagrams to compute the electron magnetic
moment [49] has no right to complain about anything that is merely “rather complicated”. Zurek further
says that Gleason “provides no motivation why the measure he obtains should have any physical signif-
icance — i.e., why should it be regarded as probability”. This exchanges cart and horse. The ethos of
Gleason’s theorem is to start with structures that do not look probabilistic in character (Hilbert spaces
and orthonormal bases, or orthomodular lattices if you’re a quantum logician [50, 51]). Then one says that
to be meaningful, a physical theory must at least make statistical predictions. One introduces Gleason’s
“frame functions” because one is motivated to find probabilities. And thus, all the structures that follow
naturally inherit a probabilistic character, including the set of pure states. Of course, this clashes with the
widespread gut-level conviction that a state vector |ψ〉 simply cannot be probabilistic in nature, and thus
with Zurek’s more specific claim that symmetries within a |ψ〉 are somehow “objective”. Most arguments
in quantum foundations are, ultimately, gastric distress.
8any integerM > 0, there must be a finitely exchangeable distribution with more arguments,
pN+M , such that
p(x1, . . . , xN) =
∑
xN+1,...,xN+M
pN+M(x1, . . . , xN , xN+1, . . . , xN+M). (6)
These two requirements make precise the idea that Alice’s probability assignment p derives
from an arbitrarily long sequence of random variables, the order of which is, in Alice’s judg-
ment, inconsequential. We say that a p which satisfies both conditions, finite exchangeability
and extendable, is exchangeable.
Let ∆k denote the space of valid probability assignments over k outcomes. Then, the
classical de Finetti theorem shows that exchangeability implies that
p(x1, . . . , xN) =
∫
∆k
d~pP (~p ) px1 · · · pxN =
∫
∆k
d~pP (~p ) pn11 · · · pnkk , (7)
where P (~p) is properly normalized over ∆k:∫
∆k
d~pP (~p ) = 1. (8)
The quantum version replaces an integral over the probability simplex ∆k with an inte-
gral over quantum state space, furnishing a representation of exchangeable quantum-state
ascriptions:
ρ(N) =
∫
dρP (ρ)ρ⊗N . (9)
Just as the classical de Finetti theorem revealed how the term “unknown probability” is
merely a convenient shorthand, so does the quantum de Finetti theorem for “unknown
quantum state”.
Having established this background, we turn to the following passage from CFS 2002:
Exchangeability permits us to describe what is going on in quantum-state to-
mography. Suppose two scientists make different exchangeable state assignments
and then jointly collect data from repeated measurements. Suppose further that
the measurements are “tomographically complete”; i.e., the measurement proba-
bilities for any density operator are sufficient to determine that density operator.
The two scientists can use the data D from an initial set of measurements to up-
date their state assignments for further systems. In the limit of a large number
of initial measurements, they will come to agreement on a particular product
state ρˆD ⊗ ρˆD ⊗ · · · for further systems, where ρˆD is determined by the data.
This is what quantum-state tomography is all about. The updating can be cast
as an application of Bayes’s rule to updating the generating function in light of
the data [Schack, Brun and Caves [56]]. The only requirement for “coming to
agreement” is that both scientists should have allowed for the possibility of ρˆD
by giving it nonzero support in their initial generating functions.
QBism refuses to go down this path. Indeed, it balks at the first step. “Suppose two
scientists make different exchangeable state assignments and then jointly collect data from
repeated measurements” — no, we’re stopping right there. QBism insists that measurement
outcomes are personal to the agent who elicits them.
9A QBist take on the quantum de Finetti theorem puts all the state assignments into a
single user’s internal mesh of beliefs. Alice supposes that tomorrow, she will make a multi-
partite, exchangeable state ascription, perhaps ρ(N)1 or perhaps ρ
(N)
2 . Using the quantum de
Finetti theorem, she represents the first joint state as a “meta-probability density” P1(ρ):
ρ
(N)
1 =
∫
dρP1(ρ)ρ⊗N , (10)
and likewise for ρ(N)2 . If the density functions P1(ρ) and P2(ρ) have at least a little agreement,
Alice can expect that her initial choice will wash out. That is, her expectation now for
her future mesh of beliefs is that the choice between the ascriptions P1(ρ) and P2(ρ) will
eventually become inconsequential. So, there is definitely a story to be told about the
mathematics, perhaps a rather important one, but it is not the story given in CFS 2002.3
Recalling Fuchs’ three distinguishing characteristics of QBism, it is difficult to argue
that they are present in CFS 2002. The “formal structure” is not reshaped in look or
in feel, merely propped up by a couple extant theorems, one of them known since 1957.
Two levels of radical personalism are not present — there is only one, and it is but tepidly
embraced, while the other is flatly contradicted. The third characteristic, the “start of a great
journey”, receives an endorsement of sorts in the paper’s send-off, but one so disconnected
from everything that went before, it reads more like an afterthought than an outlook.
III. CAVES–FUCHS–SCHACK (2007)
Caves, Fuchs and Schack moved away from some positions held in their 2002 paper just
a few years later. “Subjective probability and quantum certainty” ([13], hereinafter CFS
2007) is the last work coauthored by all three of them, since as that paper was being written
and published, it became clear that Caves disagreed with Fuchs and Schack on various
points that are essential to Fuchs and Schack’s further development of QBism.4 In their
introduction, they state the following:
In a previous publication [CFS 2002], the authors were confused about the status
of certainty and pure-state assignments in quantum mechanics and thus made
statements about state preparation that we would now regard as misleading or
even wrong.
Discussions leading up to this change of heart can be found in [3, pp. 193 ff.].
There is less material in CFS 2007 that is overtly contra-QBist than there is in CFS 2002,
yet Fuchs’ later warning covers it as well [59]:
The present work, however, goes far beyond those statements in the metaphysical
conclusions it draws—so much so that the author cannot comfortably attribute
the thoughts herein to the triumvirate as a whole. Thus, the term QBism to mark
some distinction from the known common ground of Quantum Bayesianism.
3 For a pedagogical introduction to the “probabilities for future probabilities” thinking, see [57, §5.1]. For
a technical result motivated by “expected changes in expectation” concerns, see [58].
4 Caves has confirmed to me (e-mail, 24 November 2019) that he does not subscribe to QBism.
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One would think that this hazard sign would prompt a degree of caution to be taken before
treating all the citations in a list of “Quantum Bayesian” papers on equal footing.5 We can
see a trace of a divergence already manifesting in this aside:
Bayesian updating is consistent, as it should be, with logical deduction of facts
from other facts, as when the observed data d logically imply a particular hy-
pothesis h0, i.e., when Pr(d|h) = 0 for h 6= h0, thus making Pr(h0|d) = 1. Since
the authors disagree on the implications of this consistency, it is fortunate that
it is irrelevant to the point of this paper. That point concerns the status of quan-
tum measurement outcomes and their probabilities, and quantum measurement
outcomes are not related by logical implication.
CFS 2007 is evasive on the question of whether measurement outcomes are personal to
the agent who elicits them. They write of “the facts an agent acquires about the preparation
procedure”, and they say, “The occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event is a fact for the
agent.” But if the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event is a fact for everybody, it is a
fact for a specific agent too. Without forthrightly clarifying this point, CFS 2007 does not
qualify as QBist. Indeed, CFS 2007 rather undermines the point, with loose talk about “two
agents starting from the same facts, but different priors” and the like. A QBist description
would instead involve a single agent, considering the same set of quantitative data points
with either of two background meshes of belief (compare [61, 62]).
Before moving on, we note that CFS 2007 briefly discusses the Lewisian “objective chance”
philosophy. Fuchs would shortly thereafter find this discussion weak enough to be irrelevant,
or potentially even counterproductive [3, p. 1287]. Overall, CFS 2007 is the product of too
many compromises among its three authors to fairly reflect the view of any of them.
IV. THE FIRST SAMIZDAT
Notes on a Paulian Idea (2003), later reissued as Coming of Age with Quantum Infor-
mation (2011), is an edited collection of e-mail correspondence that Fuchs made public to
“back up the hard drive” after the Cerro Grande fire destroyed his family’s home in Los
Alamos [63]. My colleagues and I have elsewhere [30] quoted passages from this document
to show how later research has fulfilled their aspirations almost to the letter. Here, I take
the opposite tack.
One theme that is quite surprising to a reader familiar with QBism proper is how fre-
quently Fuchs insists upon multiple agents being necessary to reveal the hidden ontological
lesson of quantum theory. This stands in stark contrast to the “I-I-me-me-mine!” declaration
of Fuchs’ later manifesto [59]. In addition, the stories of multiple agents intermingle with
the theme that the deep physical principle of quantum theory is captured by information-
disturbance tradeoffs. This idea had vanished by the time QBism proper was articulated.
5 Indeed, such a list of predecessors occurs in Fuchs and Schack’s Reviews of Modern Physics article [2].
Cursory inspection reveals that the views tallied there should not be identified with QBism or with each
other. For example, the list includes Appleby’s “Facts, Values and Quanta” [60], which takes pains to
remain distinct from the other Quantum Bayesian writings of that period: “I should say that I do not
entirely agree with them about that. [. . .] My feeling is that a completely satisfactory theoretical account
has yet to be formulated.” And so forth.
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We can point to multiple reasons why it could easily have fallen by the wayside: The quanti-
tative expressions of it started out dense and not too illuminating [64, 65], and despite some
promising indications [66], they never really simplified.6 Moreover, the basic phenomenon of
“no information gain without disturbance” ended up being too easy to reproduce in theories
with underlying local-hidden-variable models.7
In an 18 September 1996 letter to David Mermin, we find an early occurrence of the
slogan that Fuchs and Schack would later spurn:
One always assigns probabilities based on incomplete information; it is just that
in quantum physics “maximal information is not complete.”
We find this again in another letter to Mermin, this one dated 23 July 2000:
The theory prescribes that no matter how much we know about a quantum
system—even when we have maximal information about it—there will always
be a statistical residue. There will always be questions that we can ask of a
system for which we cannot predict the outcomes. In quantum theory, maximal
information is not complete and cannot be completed.
Even sentences that were blessed with italics can turn out to be quite wrong-headed.
We can uncover early intimations of the QBist desire to find in quantum theory an
ontological lesson, without naïvely identifying the elements in the mathematical formalism
with an ontology. However, the place and manner of the search is not yet QBist. From a 4
January 1998 letter to Greg Comer:
The “fact” that my information-gathering yields a disturbance to your predic-
tions is the only “physical” (or ontological) statement that the theory makes; all
the rest of the structure is “law of thought” subject to that consideration. To
put it another way, quantum theory is a theory of “what we have the right to
say” in a world where the observer cannot be detached from what he observes.
It is that and nothing more.
And again on 22 April 1999:
Our experimentation on the world is not without consequence. When I learn
something about an object, you are forced to revise (toward the direction of
more ignorance) what you could have said of it.
Likewise, in a 30 August 1998 letter to Adrian Kent:
6 Asks Fuchs in [66], “Why is the world so constituted that binary preparations can be put together in a
way that the whole is more than a sum of the parts, but never more so than by Q ≈ 0.202 bits?” Note
that the bound of Q ≈ 0.202 bits is attained when the two alphabet states are drawn from two different
MUB; while by another measure of “quantumness” in that paper, the average global fidelity, two qubit
states are “most quantum with respect to each other” when they are drawn from a SIC.
7 True, one might be able to establish a difference in the precise shape of the tradeoff curves (compare [67]),
but that is too slender a reed to hang the distinction between quantum and classical upon. Like NASA,
at the critical juncture we want a declaration that is go/no-go.
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Suppose in a few years I could come up with a clear, precise statement of what
it is that I’m trying to get at. Something in essence that takes away the vagaries
of the statement: “The world in which we live happens to have a funny property.
It is that my information gathering about something you know, causes you to
lose some of that knowledge . . . and this happens even in the case that you know
all my actions precisely. Physical theory, and quantum mechanics in particular,
is about what we can say to each other and what we can predict of each other
in spite of that funny property.” Would that constitute something that fulfills
your Desideratum #1?
More concisely, in a letter on 2 September 1998:
Disturbance to what? To each other’s descriptions, nothing more.
The themes of information tradeoffs and multiplicity of agents are developed rather ex-
tensively in correspondence with David Mermin. On 8 September 1998:
It is crucial to my point of view that there be at least two players and two
quantum states in the game. [. . .] I think one of the troubles in our founding fa-
thers’ discussions is that they continually focused their attention on one observer
making measurements on a quantum system described by one (known) quantum
state. This led them to say things—in language similar to some of the specimens
in your note—like, “The gain of knowledge by means of an observation has as
a necessary and natural consequence the loss of some other knowledge.” (Pauli)
Without at least a second player in the game, those gains and losses hardly seem
to be sensible concepts to me: they can only refer to the observer’s attempt to
ascribe one or another classical picture to the quantum system in front of him.
Since we know—from Bell’s argument and the religion of locality—that it is not
reasonable to assume that those classical variables (correlata) are there and ex-
istent without our prodding, it is hard to call the revelation of a measurement
outcome a “gain of knowledge.” What did you learn about the world that was
there before your looking? Nothing. However, throw a second player into the
game and that situation changes. Those random quantum outcomes now have
something existent, some unknown truth, that they can be correlated with. The
revelation of an outcome really can correspond to a “gain of knowledge,” but
you need at least two information processing units in the world for that to be
the case.
And, shortly thereafter in the same note,
In your original Ithaca paper you speak of the minimal requirements for a quan-
tum mechanical universe: it is, you say, two qubits—two things to have correla-
tion without correlata. I, however, am more afraid to go that far, i.e., to some
final/overarching ontological statement. Instead, the most I think I’m willing to
ask is, “What are the minimal requirements for a physical theory?” And there,
I think the answer is two “theory makers” and a physical system.
More dramatically still, on 20 July 2000:
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Somehow I feel that I had an epiphany in Mykonos. Do you remember the
parable of “Genesis and the Quantum” from my Montréal problem set? And
do you remember my slide of an empty black box with two overlays. The first
overlay was of a big |ψ〉 (hand drawn in blue ink of course). I put the slide of
the box up first, and said, “This is a quantum system; it’s what’s there in the
world independent of us.” Then I put the first overlay on it and said, “And this
symbol stands for nothing more than [what] we know of it. Take us away and
the symbol goes away too.” I then removed the |ψ〉. “But that doesn’t mean
that the system, this black box, goes away.” Finally I put back up the |ψ〉 over
the box, and the final overlay. This one says: “Information/knowledge about
what? The consequences of our experimental interventions into the course of
Nature.”
Well, now I’ve made another overlay for my black box slide. At the top it
asks, “So what is real about a quantum system?” In the center, so that it ends
up actually in the box, is a very stylistic version of the word “Zing!” And at
the bottom it answers, “The locus of all information-disturbance tradeoff curves
for the system.” In words, I (plan to) say, “It is that zing of the system, that
sensitivity to the touch, that keeps us from ever saying more than |ψ〉 of it. This
is the thing that is real about the system. It is our task to give better expression
to that idea, and start to appreciate the doors it opens for us to shape and
manipulate the world.” What is it that makes quantum cryptography go? Very
explicitly, the zing in the system. What is that makes quantum computing go?
The zing in its components!
Anyway, I’m quite taken by this idea that’s getting so close to being a tech-
nical one—i.e., well formed enough that one might check whether there is some-
thing to it. What is real of the system is the locus of information-disturbance
(perhaps it would be better to say “information-information”) tradeoff curves.
The thing to do now is to show that Hilbert space comes about as a compact
description of that collection, and that it’s not the other way around. As I’ve
preached to you for over two years now, this idea (though it was in less refined
form before now) strikes me as a purely ontological one . . . even though it takes
inserting an Alice, Bob, and Eve into the picture to give it adequate expres-
sion. That is, it takes a little epistemology before we can get to an ontological
statement.
The number of agents is getting out of hand — not just an Alice, with whom a QBist
narrative would content itself, but a Bob and now an Eve. This is quite the dramatic excess
in the light of QBism’s single-user focus (a later development codifed in response to drilling
down on the issue of Wigner’s Friend [3, p. xli]).
“What, four? thou saidst but two even now.”
“Four, Hal; I told thee four.”
— 1 Henry IV, 2.4
We do see a backing-away from some early choices of terminology, in a 1 July 2000 letter
to Hideo Mabuchi:
I’m in Greece right now, just finished with the NATO meeting. Tomorrow
morning I leave for Capri (the QCMC conference), and then finally join Kiki in
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Munich at the end of the week. My talk was pretty successful in Mykonos; I was
pretty happy with it. For Capri I’m going to make a completely new one, this
time based on the stuff I did with Kurt Jacobs. I’ve decided the best way to say
what I’ve been hoping to get at. Question: “If the wavefunction isn’t real, then
what is it that IS real about a quantum system?” Answer: “The locus of all
information-information tradeoff curves that one can draw for such a system.”
(I’ve decided to stop calling it information-disturbance because it conveys bad
imagery and preconceptions. The disturbance is to information, so why not just
make it explicit.)
In retrospect, this prefigures Fuchs and Schack’s later excommunication of the “maximal
information is not complete” slogan — but only in retrospect. It is still locked into an
epistemic mindset, rather than a doxastic one.
In an 11 December 2000 letter to Joseph Renes:
Why am I so obsessed with always having two players in the game? Because
I want to connect all the concerns in quantum mechanics with Bayesianism as
much as I can.
At this point in time, Fuchs pretty explicitly takes the convergence among agents as the
meat of Bayesianism, rather than making the fundamental point the normative principle of
consistency within a single agent’s mesh of beliefs, with inter-agent agreement a secondary
notion (when it can meaningfully be defined at all).
V. FUCHS (2002)
Having grounded ourselves in Fuchs’ less formal solo-author writings from the late 1990s,
we are now in a better position to examine “Quantum Mechanics as Quantum Information
(and only a little more)” [68]. I have deferred discussion of this essay until now, because
much of it is technical development, and the conceptual passages where it comes off most
strongly non-QBist are best appreciated after becoming familiar with the Notes on a Paulian
Idea era. Of the three distinguishing features of QBism, we can discern the “reliance on the
mathematical tools of quantum information theory to reshape the look and feel of quantum
theory’s formal structure”, at least in a preliminary way. And, not bound by the length and
style constraints of a journal article’s “Conclusions” section, Fuchs takes the opportunity to
press the “start of a great journey” theme. But there is still only one level of personalism:
Probabilities are personal, but experiences are not. A brief excerpt suffices to show that
Fuchs attempts to launch the “great journey” just as he did at Mykonos:
The wedge that drives a distinction between Bayesian probability theory in gen-
eral and quantum mechanics in particular is perhaps nothing more than this
“Zing!” of a quantum system that is manifested when an agent interacts with
it. It is this wild sensitivity to the touch that keeps our information and beliefs
from ever coming into too great of an alignment. The most our beliefs about the
potential consequences of our interventions on a system can come into alignment
is captured by the mathematical structure of a pure quantum state |ψ〉. Take
all possible information-disturbance curves for a quantum system, tie them into
a bundle, and that is the long-awaited property, the input we have been looking
for from nature. Or, at least, that is the speculation.
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The first sentence would read fine coming from a QBist, but the rest goes barrelling down
a blind alley.
The technical discussions hold up rather better, and the paper is noteworthy as an early
example of the MIC-as-reference-measurement idea. The particular class of MIC it discusses,
later designated the orthocross MICs, still has some open conjectures about it [69].
Fuchs gives an argument for why the tensor product rule for composing state spaces
follows from Einstein locality and a Gleason-type context-independence condition. This
proof may be of significance to a category theorist [70, §2.3], as it deduces the tensor product
from the requirement that the functions of interest be linear on both halves of the composite
system. However, it does go somewhat against the grain of later reconstruction work with
Schack and others. Those efforts focused on deriving the state and measurement spaces of
a single system, which can then be resolved into components if desired. In other words, the
emphasis shifted from composition to decomposition.
The 2002 paper leaves open the question of why the joint states for a bipartite system
should be specifically positive semidefinite operators on the tensor-product space. The later
literature provides at least one answer to this question [71, 72], but at the cost of assumptions
that may feel unsatisfying on account of being physically under-motivated or mathematically
over-powered. (For example, why in the grand scheme of things should the set of entangled
pure states form a continuum?) There may yet be a theorem or two worth proving here.
Examining the motivations interleaved between the equations, we find another conceptual
issue that marks the 2002 paper as not yet QBist. It is the distinction between doxastic
consistency conditions and update rules, a point that Fuchs and Schack did not fully resolve
until the better part of a decade later [73]. Quoting [1],
Adopting a personalist Bayesian interpretation of probability does not mean
treating all changes of belief as applications of the Bayes rule. This is shocking to
some people! And distancing ourselves from the dogmatists who claim to follow
that creed is one reason why we prefer QBism over “Quantum Bayesianism”.
In the tradition of Ramsey, Savage and de Finetti, there are consistency
conditions that an agent’s probability assignments should meet at any given time,
and then there are guidelines for updating probability assignments in response
to new experiences. Going from the former to the latter requires making extra
assumptions — the two are not as strongly coupled as many people think. The
Bayes rule is not a condition on how an agent must change her probabilities, but
rather a condition for how she should expect that she will modify her beliefs in
the light of possible new experiences. For this observation, we credit Hacking,
Jeffrey and van Fraassen.
Fuchs’ writing in 2002 had not yet distinguished the crucial gap between a rule for how Alice
must change her beliefs and a criterion for how Alice should expect today that she will act
tomorrow.
This is a slip-up we encounter now and then in conversations with people who have
only heard a little about QBism, usually secondhand. (Other confusions — “But how
does QBism explain X?” — typically occur when the interlocutor has unwittingy switched
from subjective probability to objective, or from a first-person perspective to third-person,
midway through a thought process. These are habits which take discipline to avoid, at least
at first.) Evading this mental trap is another good reason not to take Fuchs’ 2002 salvo as
a definitive, genuinely QBist position statement.
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VI. FUCHS–PERES (2000)
On occasion, we have seen CFS 2002 cited on its own to define QBism (for example,
in [74, 75]). A similar yet more egregious misattribution occurs in an article by Jaeger [76],
which equates QBism with the 2000 Physics Today piece coauthored by Fuchs and Peres,
“Quantum Theory Needs No ‘Interpretation’ ” [77]. I must regretfully report that Asher
Peres was no QBist.
The specific point at which Jaeger elides the difference between QBism and fin-de-siècle
Fuchs–Peres is the following, which attributes an opinion of the latter to the former:
One QBist claim is that “quantum theory does not describe physical reality.
What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the macro-
scopic events (‘detector clicks’) that are the consequence of our experimental
interventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only
interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or theorists.”
But this is not a QBist claim. Of course, it predates QBism chronologically, but also, it
contradicts what QBism actually stands for, and in a series of rather blunt and obvious
ways. It is helpful here to quote a letter from Fuchs’ second samizdat [3, p. 1011], sent on
19 June 2005 to Greg Comer:
First off, I wish I had never said, “quantum theory does not describe physical
reality”—I really only meant “the wave function does not describe reality” and
should have stuck with that formulation. But more importantly, what precisely
are these “consequences of our interventions”? From the wording we used, one
surely gets the impression that, whatever they are—we said “detector clicks,”
but what a glib phrase!—they somehow live outside of the agent performing the
experiment. And I guess that’s what I thought at the time.
So, “detector clicks” is misleading. Moreover, “macroscopic” is a red herring, a relic of
earlier generations’ shifty grasp on what might differentiate quantum from classical. For
example, an agent whose species has evolved eyes just a bit better than human ones might
have seen individual photons flashing on a cold and lonely night. Such an agent might
regard the direct personal experience of a single photon as a microscopic event, but they
can employ the “user’s manual” that is quantum theory just as well as humans do. In brief,
the micro/macro distinction is not, to a QBist, fundamental.
Would a QBist agree that a “strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only
interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or theorists”? No, ever needed is all
wrong there. Nothing that is all that’s ever needed can be the start of a great adventure.
The Fuchs–Peres collaboration has a very un-QBist reliance upon the first-person plural.
As David Mermin has noted [78],
There is a little remarked upon but important ambiguity in the first person
plural. When Heisenberg says that quantum states are about our knowledge,
“our” can mean all of us collectively or it can mean each of us individually.
[. . .] To avoid ambiguity it is better to say “My (your, Alice’s) quantum state
assignments encapsulate my (your, her) belief” to avoid misreadings based on
implicit assumptions of a unique state assignment or of common knowledge.
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The Fuchs–Peres essay has some affinities with the Rudolf Peierls opinion piece from a decade
earlier [79] that they discussed during the writing process [63]. Mermin observes that Peierls
would sound more QBist than perhaps any other figure from the early generations of quan-
tum physicists, if he had not used the first-person plural collectively. Instead, he propagated
the old confusions. This applies with equal force to the Fuchs–Peres collaboration.
Having dismissed “our”, “macroscopic”, “detector clicks”, “ever needed” and “does not
describe physical reality”, what about “algorithm”? This, too, reflects an understanding
that had not yet matured. An algorithm is a step-by-step procedure that can be executed
mechanically.8 For example, taking the trace of the product of two matrices is a task for
which an algorithm might be written. In that sense, computing a quantum-mechanical
probability is algorithmic — but there is a deeper level of meaning, too, that the word
algorithm misses. In QBism, a state vector |ψ〉 is not more ontologically fundamental than,
say, the probability of getting a “+” outcome in a spin-z experiment. True, quantum theory
provides a rule for calculating pz(+) given a |ψ〉, but when in life is one ever given a |ψ〉,
other than the first line of a textbook problem demanding that the student “assume the
state vector is |ψ〉”?
The deeper truth is that quantum theory provides a normative lesson: When Alice
contemplates two or more von Neumann measurements upon a system, she should strive to
make her expectations for those different, mutually exclusive scenarios all consistent with
the Born Rule. But if she detects an inconsistency within her mesh of beliefs — if she finds
that there is no density operator ρ with which her varied probabilities are all in accord —
the quantum formalism itself provides no algorithm to resolve that awkwardness [16].
The novice at any art often begins by following a procedure — say, the exact volume
measurements and timings given by The Joy of Cooking, or the rubric for cranking through
questions on the AP Physics exam. With further experience, one learns how to season for
taste, what can be substituted for chicken or for eggs, how to linearize around the fixed
points and so on. The procedures are always there to be relied upon when required —
chopping a root or solving by radicals — but they are not the soul of the matter. So, too,
for quantum theory: Algorithms are what we use, not the sum total of what we need.
Fuchs and Peres present a version of the Wigner’s Friend thought-experiment. In their
portrayal, Erwin applies quantum mechanics to his colleague Cathy, who in turn applies it to
a piece of cake. The Fuchs–Peres discussion is, from a QBist standpoint, rather unforgivably
sloppy about the distinctions between ontic degrees of freedom, epistemic statements about
ontic quantities and doxastic statements regarding future personal experiences.
I would not have imagined it possible to declare that the Fuchs–Peres opinion piece defines
QBism, had I not seen it done in print.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Basically nothing posted on the arXiv before 2009 should be cited as an example of
QBism, no matter who the authors are. All the older writings fail in one or another readily
8 At least, so it was in the year 2000. Nowadays, rather than the Knuthian sense of a procedure for a
machine of known architecture, published so its performance can be analyzed, an algorithm is a trade
secret that runs “in the cloud” and whose goal is to disguise injustice and inequality as objective logic [80].
O tempora, o mores.
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apparent way to recognize at least one point that later investigation found to be necessary for
a self-consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics. That said, various technical matters
raised in those pre-QBist papers continue to be interesting even though the metaphysical
frontier has left their original motivations far behind.
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You may already know what a blow to the ego
it can be to have to read over anything you
wrote twenty years ago, even cancelled checks.
— Thomas Pynchon
Looking back it is clear, but so
much prevents you from seeing it.
— Autumn Kent
